Intelligent Conspiracy Theories: Part II

A methodology for how to look

I: INTRODUCTION

In Intelligent Conspiracy Theories: Part I, we defined a methodology for where to devote your attention as a dissident, using probability theory in the search for hidden insights which have the potential to generate outsized value in guiding your own actions.

In Part II, we will discuss how to devote your attention to these secrets. Herein, you will find principled methodologies for the collection and structured analysis of uncertain information. We will examine the utility of Bayes theorem, and break down essential techniques used in intelligence analysis.

As in Part I, we will discuss how to ensure that your dissident perspectives are incorporated productively rather than destructively into these processes, guiding you closer to the truth rather than into bottomless rabbit holes.

Our ambition will be to produce insights which are as granular and reliable as possible. We hope to identify specific actors, motivations, relationships, technologies, and actions. We do not want to be in the business of pinning adverse outcomes on unspecified ‘elites’ (although identifying specific elite individuals, groups, or coalitions can often be productive). Specificity is required to calibrate our responses, whereas the lack of specificity can be disempowering, as hostile actors blur together into a seemingly irresistible morass.

II. OVERVIEW OF OUR PROCESS

We will use a modified framework based on the ‘intelligence cycle’ model widely used by nation states. This will involve iterating through the following sequence:

• Requirements, planning, and direction

• Collection

• Analysis and production

Requirements, planning, and direction were covered in Part I of this series. Below we will consider the second two parts of the cycle, with each one illustrated in the context of a notional case study.

III. INTRODUCING THE CASE STUDY

The first sign that a conspiracy theory is not sufficiently intelligent is that the agent who is accused of pulling the strings is exclusively referred to as ‘they’, ie. ‘They want you to be dumb so that they can control you’.

There are a lot of actors in this world: individuals, corporations, public sector institutions, NGOs, international bodies, think tanks, activists, militaries, criminal organizations, as well as unofficial or undisclosed networks. 

While it is absolutely true that there are natural groupings of these organizations along ideological and pragmatic lines, if your analysis skips any examination of differentiation, and immediately and uncritically blurs together whatever actors suit your stoner-tier narrative, you will end up with an unserious end-product. 

In fact, each of these actors operates within different frameworks of incentives and pressures, even where these differences are subtle. To understand their activities. first understand them as individual agents: their nature, their composition, their origins, their evolution, their statements, their incentives, their funding, their documented actions. 

An acceptable outcome is to discover that a reality is more complex than generally accepted. Even if this is all you discover: you know more than you once did and than others still do.  

Typically you’ll have to stitch together information sourced from multiple parties - including statements made by the actors themselves - to isolate reliable information. If you’re going to trust a piece of data, you should have a very clear idea where it comes from; it’s common for a media publication to misreport something and then for that erroneous information to be regurgitated by future publications - referencing the first - until the error seems like the incontrovertible truth. Find and evaluate primary sources - more on this below. Once you understand your proposed actors, it’s time to examine their relationships to other actors. Again - healthy skepticism is a must! 

Now: let’s make up a notional conspiracy theory and examine it:

A rumor is widely circulated in your circles that a hostile, Antifa-adjacent NGO has access to internal Google data, presumably through some sympathetic insider, and makes use of this to investigate and doxx anons. This has apparently already happened to at least one person in your circle. As a user of their many services, Google has a huge amount of data on you, and if this is true, it would leave you vulnerable.

For the purposes of this case study, let’s make things more complex by adding the condition that you don’t know exactly where this rumor originated, so you cannot simply go to the alleged victim of this doxxing and get a complete download of everything they know about the situation. Even if you could identify the person, it’s common that victims of doxxing are not entirely sure of all the elements which led to their exposure, with many skeptical of the ‘official’ explanations.

This situation sounds plausible, right? But do you actually have enough information in order to chart a path forwards with a high ‘expected value’? Well, let’s find out.